The Early Stoics

Reading 6 – Stoic Ethics in Cicero's *On Ends*

Reading 5
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The primary source for the following text is
Book 3 of Cicero's *On Ends (On the Ends of Good Things and Bad Things)*.

The following text presents the whole of *On Ends* 3.1-76 in translated form (in roman type) and narrative summary form (in *italics*). All section numbers are part of Book 3. For example, section 7, or [7], is 3.7.

This reading comes from the Cave's
The Best of the Early Stoics: The Lives, Writings & Teachings of the Early Stoics.

Stoic Ethics

in Cicero's *On Ends*

Summary of the Reading from *On Ends*

In conversation with Cicero, Marcus Cato[1] offers to "expound the whole system of Zeno and the Stoics." He begins with the impulse toward self-preservation that humans naturally have. Pleasure, by contrast, is not one of the "primary objects of natural impulse." Further, "that which is in itself in accord with nature" is "deserving of choice" and thus "valuable." An "appropriate act," therefore, is one in accord with nature. The goal is to build fixed habits by means of conditioning choice with appropriate actions. Ultimately, however, the goal is to rationalize such choice and behavior, to understand "the order and . . . the harmony that governs conduct," and to realize this as "the highest good of a human being, the thing that is praiseworthy and desirable for its own sake." Moral goodness, then, is activity in conformity

with nature, specifically "the order and . . . the harmony that governs conduct." To say it another way, "the final aim is to live in agreement and harmony with nature." This is the life of virtue. From "primary natural instincts," then, humans move to wisdom. It is the wise who are always happy. In addition to these central points, Cato discusses others, including the fact that moral baseness is the only evil; the Stoic teaching regarding things preferred and things not; the virtues; the origin of human communities in "parental affection for their children"; and friendship.

The Reading from *On Ends*

1-6 *Having dealt with Epicureanism or "pleasure"* [2] *in the first two books of* On Ends *(the conclusion: "Let us send pleasure away; . . . we have driven pleasure away"), Cicero advances to explore further the final and ultimate good. "The question," he says, "is this: What is the highest good?"*[3] *He explains how he has to employ "new terms [in Latin] to convey new [Greek] ideas [to Romans]." Such a coinage of terms is itself nothing new, he avers. "Of all the philosophers"—where he notes in passing that "philosophy is the art of life"—"the Stoics have been the greatest innovators in this respect, and Zeno their founder was actually an inventor of new terms rather than a discoverer of new ideas." Cicero then moves on to the conversation and its circumstances.*

[7] "I [Cicero] was down at my place at Tusculum. I wanted to consult some books from the library of the young Lucullus, so I went to his villa, as I was in the habit of doing, to help myself to the ones I needed. On my arrival, I found Marcus Cato seated in the library. I had not known he was there. He was surrounded by many books on Stoicism—for he possessed, as you are aware, an insatiable appetite for reading and could never get enough of it." . . .

8-9 *Cicero greets Marcus Cato, explaining that he came to the countryside due to the beginning of the games in Rome. They briefly discuss Lucullus (for whom Cato has charge) and his education and studies that "will render him better equipped when he comes to the business of life." Cato then asks Cicero why he has come "when you have so large a library of your own." Cicero clarifies—"for some notes and writings of Aristotle," he says.*

[10] "How I wish," Marcus said, "that you had been inclined to the Stoics! You of all men might have been expected to count virtue as the only good."

"Perhaps *you* might rather have been expected," I answered, "to refrain from adopting a new terminology for things when in substance you think as I do. We are united in our account of things; it is our language that battles."

"Indeed," he said, "our language does not agree in the least. Once pronounce anything to be desirable, once reckon anything a good other than the noble or morally good, and you have extinguished the very light of virtue,—that is, moral goodness itself—, and you have overthrown virtue entirely."

[11] "That all sounds great, Cato," I said, "but are you aware that you share your glorious talk with Pyrrho [the skeptic] and with Ariston, who make all things equal? So I want to know what you think about them."

"You ask what I think?" he said. "My view is that those good, brave, just, and moderate men—those we learn about from history or we ourselves have seen in public life—accomplished many praiseworthy things by following nature itself rather than receiving any instruction. Those men were better educated by nature than they could possibly have been by philosophy had they accepted any other system of philosophy than the one that counts moral goodness the only good and moral baseness the only evil. Other ways of philosophy—those which count things good or evil that have nothing to do with virtue—do not merely fail to help us in becoming better men, but they corrupt our natural character. Either this point must be firmly held, that moral goodness is the only good, or there is no way to prove that virtue produces a happy life. And if that is true, then I do not know why we exert ourselves to study philosophy. For if it is possible for the wise man to be wretched, then I would not much value this virtue that is so celebrated and talked about."

12-15 *Cicero again contends that Cato's views are the same as any "follower of Pyrrho or Ariston." Cato disagrees. The Stoics choose among things "in accord with nature," he says, whereas the others make everything equal, thereby leaving no means of judgment and so "destroying virtue itself." But to explain thoroughly, he will give a full account of Stoicism. "Since we are at leisure, I will expound the whole system of Zeno and the Stoics." Cicero gladly agrees to the proposal. After a brief discussion regarding the use of Latin words in place of the original Greek, Cato commences his account.*

[16] "It is the view of those whose system I accept," he said, "that a living being feels an attachment to itself from the very moment it is born—which, by the way, is the right place to start. From this moment on, it feels an impulse to preserve itself and to feel affection for its own constitution and for those things that tend to preserve that constitution. By contrast, it feels an aversion for destruction and for those things that appear to bring destruction.

"In order to show the accuracy of this account, the Stoics point out that infants, even before they have experienced pleasure or pain, desire healthy things and reject the opposite. But this would not happen unless they prized their own constitution and feared destruction. Even then it would be impossible for them to desire at all unless they possessed self-consciousness wherein they felt affection for themselves. From this we may understand that the first impulse to action arises from this prizing of self—this self-love or self-affection. This leads to the conclusion that it is love of self that supplies the primary impulse to action.

[17] "But pleasure, according to most Stoics, is not to be placed among the primary objects of natural impulse. And I very strongly agree with them—for many shameful things will occur if we think that nature has placed pleasure among the first objects of desire.

"But the fact of our affection for the objects first adopted at nature's prompting seems to require no other proof than this—that there is no one who, given the choice, would not prefer to have all the parts of his body sound and whole rather than maimed or distorted even though equally serviceable.

"Again, acts of cognition,—those which we may term 'comprehensions' or 'perceptions,' or, if these words are distasteful or obscure, then we can fall back on the Greek *katalēpseis* or 'direct apprehensions,'—these acts we consider suitable to be adopted for their own sake because they possess an element that, so to speak, embraces and contains the truth. This can be seen in the case of children who take pleasure, we may observe, in finding something out for themselves by the use of reason, even though they gain nothing by it.

[18] "We also hold that the sciences[4] are things that should be chosen for their own sake—partly because there is in them something worthy of choice, partly because they consist of acts of cognition and contain an element of fact established by methodical reasoning. The mental assent to what is false, the Stoics believe, is more repugnant than all the other things that are contrary to nature." . . .

19 *As an aside, Cato comments on the "bald style" of his discourse so far given the topic. Cicero responds that "any clear statement of an important topic possesses excellence of style."*

[20] "To proceed then," Cato said, "since we have been digressing from the primary impulses of nature. And with these impulses the later stages must be in harmony.

"The next step is the following fundamental classification. It is that which is in itself in accord with nature, or which produces something else that is so, and which, therefore, is deserving of choice since it possesses a certain amount of positive value—*axia*, in Greek, as the Stoics call it. They call this 'valuable'—for so I suppose we may translate it. On the other hand, that which is the contrary of the former they term 'valueless.'

"The initial principle being thus established—that things in accord with nature are 'things to be taken' for their own sake, and their opposites similarly are 'things to be rejected,'—the first 'duty' or

'appropriate act' (for so I render the Greek *kathēkon*) is to preserve oneself in one's natural constitution. The next is to retain those things that are in accord with nature and to repel those that are the contrary. Then, when this principle of choice and rejection has been discovered, there follows choice conditioned by appropriate action. And these continue on, a fixed habit. And finally choice is fully rationalized and in harmony with nature. It is at this final stage that the good—properly so-called—first emerges and comes to be understood in its true nature.

[21] "A human being's first attraction is toward the things that are in accord with nature. But as soon as he has understanding—or, rather, as soon as he becomes capable of a 'notion,' which is called *ennoia* or 'concept' by the Stoics—and has discerned the order and, so to speak, the harmony that governs conduct, he consequently values this harmony far more highly than all the things for which he originally felt an affection. And by exercise of intelligence and reason he infers the conclusion that 'herein resides the highest good of a human being, the thing that is praiseworthy and desirable for its own sake.' This thing consists in what the Stoics term *homologia*, which we will call 'conformity' or 'agreement'—if the term is acceptable to you. In this resides that good which is the end to which all else is a means—moral conduct and moral goodness itself. It alone is counted as a good. And although it is a later development, it is nevertheless the sole thing that is desirable for its own efficacy and value, whereas none of the primary objects of nature is desirable for its own sake.

[22] "But since those actions that I have termed 'duties' or 'appropriate acts' are based on the primary natural objects, it follows that the former are means to the latter. So it may correctly be said that all appropriate acts are means to the end of attaining the primary needs of nature. Yet it must not be inferred that their attainment is the ultimate good, inasmuch as moral action is not one of the primary natural attractions, but is an outgrowth of these, a later development, as I have said. At the same time, moral action is in accord with nature and stimulates our desire far more strongly than all the objects that attracted us earlier.

"At this point a word of caution is necessary. It will be an error to infer that this view implies *two* ultimate goods. For even though a man resolves to aim accurately with a spear or arrow at some target, we say that his ultimate end, corresponding to the ultimate good, would be to do all he could to aim straight. The man in this illustration would have to do everything to aim straight, and yet, even though he did everything to achieve his purpose, his 'ultimate end,' so to speak, would be what corresponded to what we call the highest good in the conduct of life, whereas the actual hitting of the target would be, as we say, 'to be chosen' but not 'to be desired.'

[23] "Again, as all 'appropriate acts' are based on the primary impulses of nature, it follows that wisdom itself is also based on them. Nevertheless, even as one man who is introduced to another often values this new man more highly than he does the man who gave him the introduction, so in like manner it is by no means surprising that, even though we are first entrusted to wisdom by the initial instincts of nature, later on wisdom itself becomes dearer to us than the instincts from which we came to her. And just as our limbs are so fashioned that it is clear that they were given to us with a view to a certain mode of life, so the appetite or grasping impulse of the soul—which is called *hormē* in Greek—was obviously designed not for any kind of life one may choose but for a particular mode of life. And the same is true regarding reason and perfected reason.

[24] "For just as an actor or dancer has assigned to him not any but a particular part or dance, so life has to be led in a certain kind of fixed way—not in any way we like. This fixed way we speak of as conformable and suitable. In fact we do not consider wisdom to be like piloting a ship or medicine; rather, it is like the arts of acting and dancing just mentioned. Its end, being the actual exercise of the art, is contained within the art itself and is not something extraneous to it. At the same time there is another point that marks a dissimilarity between wisdom and these arts as well. In the latter, a movement perfectly executed nevertheless does not involve all the various motions that together constitute the subject matter of the art. By contrast, in

the sphere of conduct, what we may call, if you approve, 'right actions' or 'rightly performed actions' (in Stoic terms, *katorthōmata*), contain all the factors of virtue. For wisdom alone is entirely self-contained. But this is not the case with the other arts.

[25] "It is erroneous, however, to place the end of medicine or of navigation exactly on a par with the end of wisdom. For wisdom includes also magnanimity and justice and a sense of superiority to everything that happens to a man, but this is not the case with the other arts. Again, even the very virtues I have just mentioned cannot be attained by anyone unless he has realized that all things are indifferent and indistinguishable except for those that are morally good and morally base.

[26] "We may now observe how strikingly the principles I have established support the following corollaries. Inasmuch as the final good—and you have doubtlessly observed that I have all along been giving the Greek term *telos* either as final or ultimate or highest good, and for final or ultimate good we may also give end or goal—inasmuch, then, as the final good is to live in agreement and harmony with nature, it necessarily follows that all wise men at all times enjoy a happy, perfect, and fortunate life, free from all hindrance, interference, or want. The essential principle—not merely of the school of philosophy I am discussing but also of our life and fortunes—is that we should judge moral goodness to be the only good. . . .

[29] "Once again, could it be denied that it is impossible for there ever to exist a man of steadfast, firm, and lofty mind—such a one as we call a brave man—unless it be established that pain or suffering is not an evil? For just as it is impossible for one who counts death as an evil not to fear death, so in no case can a man disregard and despise a thing that he judges to be evil. If this is admitted, we adopt as our premise that the great and brave soul looks down on and disregards whatever may possibly happen to a man. The conclusion follows that nothing is evil that is not base. More: the lofty, excellent, magnanimous, and truly brave man, who judges all human vicissitudes beneath him,—I mean, the character we desire to produce, our ideal man,—must unquestionably have faith in himself and in his own character both past and future. He must think well of himself, holding that no ill can befall the wise man. From this we understand that moral goodness alone is good, and that to live honorably, that is virtuously, is to live happily. . . .

[31] "We conclude, then, that the highest good consists in applying to the conduct of life a knowledge of the working of natural causes, choosing what is in accord with nature and rejecting what is contrary to it. In other words, the highest good is to live in harmony and in agreement with nature.

[32] "But in the other arts, when we speak of an 'artistic' or 'skillful' performance, this quality must be considered as being in a sense subsequent to and a result of the action. It is what the Stoics term *epigennēmatikon* (a result or consequence). By contrast, in conduct, when we speak of an act as 'wise,' the term is appropriately applied from the very beginning of the act. For every action that the wise man initiates must necessarily be complete straightaway in all its parts. This is so since the thing desirable, as we term it, consists in his activity. To explain, both the performance of and the results that come upon the following acts are morally sinful—when we betray our country or use violence against our parents or rob a temple. By contrast, the passions of fear, grief, and desire are moral faults from the very beginning, even if one does not act based upon the passion or there are no consequences. Similarly, actions arising from virtue are to be judged right from their very beginning and not in their successful completion.

[33] "Again, the term 'good,' which has been employed so frequently in this discourse, is also explained by definition. The Stoic definitions do indeed differ from one another in a very small way, but they all point in the same direction. Personally, I agree with Diogenes in defining the good as that which is by nature complete. He was led by this also to pronounce the 'beneficial'—let us translate the Greek *ōphelēma* in this way—to be a motion or state in accord with that which is by nature complete.

"Now notions of things are produced in the soul when something has become known either by

experience or combination of ideas or analogy or logical inference. The mind ascends by inference from those things in accord with nature until finally it arrives at the notion of good. [34] At the same time goodness is absolute and is not a matter of degree. The good is recognized and pronounced to be good from its own inherent properties and not by comparison with other things. Just as honey, though extremely sweet, is yet perceived to be sweet by its own unique kind of flavor and not by being compared with something else, so this good that we are discussing is indeed superlatively valuable, yet its value depends on its unique kind and not on quantity. . . . The value of virtue is therefore unique and distinct; it depends on its kind and not on degree.

[35] "Moreover, the passions of the soul render the life of the unwise wretched and harsh. By the way, the Greeks call the passions *pathē*.[5] I could have translated this term literally and called them 'diseases.' But the word 'disease' would not work in every instance. For example, no one speaks of pity or anger as a disease; rather, the Greeks term these *pathos*. Let us, then, accept the term 'passion' (*perturbatio*), the very sound of which seems to denote something vicious. These passions are not excited by any natural influence. The list of the passions is divided into four kinds, with many subdivisions.

"The four passions are grief, fear, desire, and the one the Stoics commonly call by the name *hēdonē* (pleasure), the one related both to the body and the soul, which I prefer to call 'delight,' meaning the sensuous elation of the soul when in a state of exaltation.[6] These passions, I say, are not excited by any natural influence; rather, they are all mere beliefs and fickle judgments. Therefore, the wise man will always be free from them.

[36] "The view that all moral goodness is intrinsically desirable is one that we hold in common with many other systems of philosophy. Aside from three schools that shut out virtue from the highest good altogether, all the remaining philosophers are committed to this view, and most of all the Stoics with whom we are now concerned, and who hold that nothing else but moral goodness is to be counted as a good at all. But this position is one that is extremely simple and easy to defend. For who is there that possesses an avarice so consuming and appetites so unbridled, that, even though he is willing to commit any crime to achieve his end, and even though he is absolutely sure of impunity, yet he would not a hundred times rather attain the same object by innocent than by guilty means? . . .

[38] "On the other hand, what man of honorable family and good upbringing and education is not shocked by moral baseness as such, even when it is not calculated to do him personally any harm? Who can view without disgust a person whom he believes to be dissolute and an evildoer? Who does not hate the base, the empty, the frivolous, the worthless? Moreover, if we decide that baseness is not a thing to be avoided for its own sake, what arguments can be given against men who want to indulge in every sort of disgraceful activity when alone and under cover of darkness, unless they are deterred by the essential and intrinsic repulsiveness of what is base? Endless reasons could be given in support of this view, but they are not necessary. For nothing is less open to doubt than that what is morally good is to be desired for its own sake, and, similarly, what is morally base is to be avoided for its own sake.

[39] "Again, the principle already discussed, that moral goodness is the sole good, involves the corollary that it is of more value than those neutral things which it procures. On the other hand, when we say that folly, cowardice, injustice, and immoderation are to be avoided because of the consequences they entail, this statement must not be so construed as to appear inconsistent with the principle already set down, that moral baseness alone is evil. This is so because the consequences referred to are not a matter of bodily harm but of the base conduct to which vices give rise—and I prefer the term *vitium* or 'vice' to 'badness' as a translation of what the Greeks call *kakia*." . . .

40-41 *Cicero agrees to Cato's use of the Latin term "vitium" for vice, saying, "It seems to me that you are teaching philosophy to speak Latin and thus naturalizing her as a Roman citizen." Resuming his description of Stoicism, Cato points out that the disagreement between the Peripatetic school and*

the Stoics is substantial rather than merely verbal. This is true regarding both good and bad things.

[42] "The Stoic account that considers pain no evil clearly proves that the wise man retains his happiness amid the worst torments. The mere fact that men endure the same pain more easily when they voluntarily undergo it for the sake of their country than when they suffer it for some lesser cause shows that the intensity of the pain depends on the belief or expectation of the sufferer and not on its own intrinsic nature. . . .

[43] *And as for bodily or external goods*, . . . "The Peripatetics hold that the happy life includes bodily advantages or conveniences. We Stoics deny this altogether. We hold that even a multitude of those goods—those we call 'actual goods'—does not make for a happier or more desirable or valuable life. Even less, therefore, is the happy life made by the accumulation of bodily advantages or conveniences.

[44] "Clearly if wisdom as well as bodily strength and health are both desirable, a combination of the two would be more desirable than wisdom alone. But even if both are counted valuable, it does not follow that wisdom *plus* bodily strength and health is worth more than wisdom by itself separately. We judge bodily strength and health to be deserving of a certain value, but we do not count it a good. At the same time we rate no value so highly as to count it above virtue. This is not the view of the Peripatetics, who are bound to say that an action that is both morally good and not attended by pain is more desirable than the same action if accompanied by pain. We see things differently." . . .

[45] *To illustrate the point,* "The light of an oil lamp is rendered insignificant as it disappears in the light of the sun. A drop of honey is lost in the vastness of the Aegean sea. An additional few coins is nothing amid the wealth of Croesus[7]—as is a single step in the journey from here to India. Similarly, if we accept the Stoic definition of the end of goods,—that is, the ultimate end of goods—, it follows that all the value you set on all these bodily things must necessarily be overwhelmed and rendered insignificant by the splendor and excellence of virtue. And just as opportuneness is not increased by prolongation in time—since things we call opportune have attained their proper measure—so right conduct, as well as suitable conduct, and lastly the good itself . . . are not capable of increase or addition.[8] [46] For these things that I speak of, such as opportuneness mentioned before, are not made greater by prolongation. For this reason, the Stoics do not judge the happy life to be any more attractive or desirable if it is long lasting compared to if it is short. . . .

[48] "So it would be consistent with the principles already stated that on the theory of those who judge the end of goods—that which we call the extreme or ultimate good—to be capable of degree, they should also hold that one man can be wiser than another, and similarly that one can commit a more sinful or more righteous action than another. But this is a position that is not available for us to take—those of us who do not think that the end of goods can vary in degree. For just as a drowning man who is so close to the surface of the water that at any moment he might come up into the air is no more able to breathe than if he were actually at the bottom already, and just as a puppy on the point of opening its eyes is no less blind than one just born, similarly a man that has made some progress toward the state of virtue is no less in misery than the one who has made no progress at all.

"I am aware that all this seems paradoxical. But as our previous conclusions are undoubtedly true and well established, and as these are the logical inferences from them, the truth of these inferences also cannot be called into question. Yet even though the Stoics deny that either virtues or vices can be increased in degree, they nevertheless believe that each of them can be in a sense expanded and widened in scope. . . .

[50] "After conclusively proving that moral goodness alone is good and moral baseness alone is evil, the Stoics go on to affirm that among those things that are of no importance for happiness or misery, there is nevertheless an element of difference making some of them of positive and others of negative value, and others neutral.

[51] "Among things valuable—for example, health, unimpaired senses, freedom from pain, fame, wealth, and the like—they say that some present us with adequate grounds for preferring them to other things, while others do not. Similarly, among those things that are of negative value, some present us with adequate grounds for rejecting them—things such as pain, disease, loss of the senses, poverty, disgrace, and the like. Others do not.

"In Zeno's terminology, there consequently arose the distinction between *proēgmena* (things preferred) and *apoproēgmena* (things not preferred). Zeno, in using the well-supplied Greek language, still employed novel words coined for the occasion—a license not permitted to us who must use the poor vocabulary of Latin, even though you are fond of saying that Latin is actually better supplied than Greek.

"To make it easier to understand the meaning of this term *proēgmena*, it will not be out of place to explain the method that Zeno followed in coining it. [52] He remarks that in a royal court, no one speaks of the king himself as 'promoted' to honor (for that is the meaning of *proēgmenon*), but the term is applied to those holding some office of state whose rank most nearly approaches—though it is second to—the royal supremacy. Similarly, in the conduct of life, the title *proēgmenon*—that is, 'promoted,'—is given not to those things that are in the first rank but to those that hold the second place. . . .

[53] "Since we declare that everything that is good occupies the first rank, it follows that this which we term 'preferred' or 'superior' is neither good nor evil. We accordingly define it as being indifferent but having a moderate value." . . .

54 *Cato further discusses and illustrates the point.*

[55] "Next comes the division of goods into three kinds. First, there are those that belong to the ultimate end. . . . Secondly, there are those that are productive of the end. . . . Thirdly, there are those that are both. The only instances of goods that belong to the ultimate end are morally good actions. The only instance of a productive good is a friend. As for the last, the Stoics say that wisdom belongs both to and produces the end. Since it is an appropriate activity, it belongs; since it causes and produces morally good actions, it is productive.

[56] "The things we call 'preferred' are sometimes preferred for their own sake, sometimes because they produce a certain result, and sometimes for both reasons. We prefer certain facial expressions or bodily postures or sensations . . . for what they are in themselves. We prefer other things because they produce a certain result. Take money, for example. As for other things, such as unimpaired senses and good health, we prefer them for both reasons.

[57] "About 'good reputation' (that term being a better translation of the Stoic expression *eudoxia* in this context than 'glory'), Chrysippus and Diogenes used to declare that it is, apart from any practical value it may possess, not worth stretching out a finger for. And I strongly agree with them. On the other hand, their successors, finding themselves unable to resist the attacks of Carneades, declared that good reputation, as I have called it, is preferred and desirable for its own sake, and that a man of good upbringing and liberal education will desire to be well-regarded by his parents and relatives, and by good men also—and that for its own sake and not for any practical advantage. And they argue that just as we desire the welfare of our children for their own sake—even the welfare of those that may be born after we are dead—, so a man should be mindful of his reputation even after death, for itself and apart from any advantage. . . .

[62] "The Stoics hold that it is important to understand that nature creates in parents a love and affection for their children. This love and affection is the source to which we trace the origin of the association of humankind in communities. The point is clear from the configuration of the body and its members, which are enough by themselves to reveal that nature's scheme includes the procreation of offspring. Still, it would not be consistent to hold that nature wills offspring to be born and yet makes no provision for that offspring, when born, to be loved and cherished. We can perceive nature's influence relative to these points even in the activity of the lower animals. Observing the labor they spend on bearing and rearing their young, we seem to be listening to the voice

of nature itself. Accordingly, as it is manifest that it is natural for us to shrink from pain, so it is apparent that we are driven by nature itself to love those whom we have begotten.

[63] "From this impulse arises the sense of mutual attraction that unites human beings—something that is also directed by nature." *Cato mentions other animals, some "born for themselves alone," others such as the ant and bee that "do certain actions for the sake of others."* . . . "With human beings, this bond of mutual aid represents an even greater or closer connection. It follows that we are by nature equipped to form marital unions, assemblies, and cities or states.

[64] "The Stoics hold that the cosmos is governed by divine will. It is both a city and a state of which both men and gods are members—and each one of us is a part of this cosmos. From this, it naturally follows that we should prefer the common advantage more than our own. For just as the laws set the safety of all above the safety of individuals, so a good, wise, and law-abiding man, conscious of his duty to the state, has regard for the advantage of all more than his own advantage or that of any single individual. The man who betrays his country does not deserve greater censure than the man who betrays the common advantage or security for the sake of his own advantage or security. This explains why praise is owed to one who dies for the republic since it is fitting for us to love our own fatherland more than ourselves. And as we feel it inhuman and wicked for men to declare . . . that they do not care if, when they themselves are dead, the conflagration of the whole earth follows, it is certainly true that we are bound to have regard for the good of posterity for its own sake.

[65] "This is the feeling that has given rise to the practice of making a will and appointing guardians for one's children when one is dying. And the fact that no one would care to pass his life alone in a desert—even though supplied with never-ending, abundant pleasures—readily shows that we are born for marriage, society, and for a natural partnership with our fellow men. Moreover, nature moves us with the desire to benefit as many people as we can, particularly by handing on information and the principles of wisdom.

[66] "Consequently, it would be hard to discover anyone who would not hand on to another any knowledge that he may himself possess—so strong is our propensity not only to learn but also to teach. And just as bulls have a natural instinct to fight with all their strength and force in defending their calves against lions, so men of exceptional gifts and capacity for service,—those like Hercules and Liber in the legends,—feel a natural impulse to be the protectors of mankind. Also, when we confer upon Jove the titles of Most Good and Most Great, of Savior, Lord of Guests, and Supporter, what we wish to convey is that he watches over the safety of humankind. But how inconsistent it would be for us to expect the immortal gods to love and value us when we ourselves despise and neglect one another! Therefore, just as we actually use our limbs before we have learned what they were given to us for, so we are united and allied by nature in the common society of the state. If this were not the case, there would be no place either for justice or benevolence.

[67] "But just as the Stoics hold that man is united with man by the bonds of justice, so they consider that no justice exists between human beings and animals. Chrysippus said it well when he said that all other things were created for the sake of men and gods. . . . So men can make use of animals for their own purposes without injustice. And the nature of man, he said, is such that, as it were, a code of law exists between the individual and humankind. He who upholds this law will be counted just. He who departs from it will be counted unjust. . . .

[68] "Again, since we see that man is designed by nature to safeguard and protect his fellow men, it follows from this natural disposition that the wise man should desire to support and manage the republic. He also desires to live in accord with nature by joining with a wife in order to have children by her—for even the passion of love, when it is pure, is not judged inconsistent with a wise man. . . ."

69 *After briefly addressing "the principles and habits of the Cynics" and whether they are "appropriate for the wise man," Cato discusses "benefits and injuries" and "advantages and*

disadvantages" relative to the community.

[70] "The Stoics recommend the cultivation of friendship, classing it among 'things beneficial.' In friendship, some profess that the wise man will hold his friends' interests as dear as his own while others say that a man's own interests must necessarily be dearer to him. At the same time, the latter admit that to enrich oneself by another's loss is an action repugnant to that justice toward which we seem to possess a natural propensity. But the school I am discussing emphatically rejects the view that we adopt or approve either justice or friendship for the sake of their utility. For if we did, the same claims of utility would be able to undermine and overthrow them. In fact, the very existence of both justice and friendship will be impossible if they are not desired for their own sake.

[71] "Justice, moreover, properly so-called, exists by nature. And it is foreign to the nature of the wise man not only to wrong but even to hurt anyone. Nor again is it right to enter into a partnership in wrongdoing with one's friends or benefactors. And the Stoics most vehemently and truly maintain that it is not possible to separate fairness from usefulness, and that whatever is fair and just is also honorable, and conversely, whatever is honorable will also be just and fair. . . .

[74] "I have let myself be carried beyond the requirements of the plan that I set before me. The truth is that I have been led on by the admirable structure of the Stoic system and the extraordinary sequence of its topics. By the immortal gods, are you not amazed?" . . .

75-76 *Cato closes with one last portrayal of the consistent nature of the wise man—the one who is a true king and master, rich, beautiful, and free. He is "the slave of no appetite." Cato's final question:* [76] "If, then, it is true that all the good and none but the good are happy, what possession is greater than philosophy, or what is more divine than virtue?"

So ends Reading 6.

See you in Reading 7, "Stoic Natural Philosophy or Physics in Other Ancient Authors."

NOTES

[1] Marcus Porcius Cato (95-46 BC) was a Roman statesman and convinced Stoic.

[2] For Cicero's treatment of Epicureanism in the voice of L. Manlius Torquatus, see Eighteen, "Epicureanism in Cicero's *On the Ends of Good Things and Bad Things*" in the Cave's *The Best of Epicurus: The Life, Writings & Teachings of Epicurus the Greek Philosopher*. The Latin word for pleasure in the text is *voluptas*. In Book 2 of Cicero's *On Ends*, M. Cato states, "I mean the same by 'pleasure' [*voluptas*] as Epicurus does by [the Greek] *hēdonē*. One often has some trouble discovering a Latin word that is the precise equivalent of a Greek word. In this case, however, no search was necessary. No instance can be found of a Latin word that more exactly conveys the same meaning as the corresponding Greek word than does the word *voluptas*. Every person in the world who knows Latin attaches to this word two ideas—that of gladness of mind, and that of a delightful excitation of agreeable feeling in the body" (2.13).

[3] The Latin for "highest good" is *summum bonum*. Elsewhere, he gives it as "the final [*extremum*] and ultimate [*ultimum*] good" (*On Ends* 1.29).

[4] "Science" here is *ars*, which ranges in meaning from "art" or "practical skill" to "knowledge" or "general principles" (a general understanding of things). Elsewhere, we give *ars* as art or skill.

[5] *Pathē* (singular) is the Greek that appears in Cicero's text. It is any passive state—what happens to a person. Others give *pathos* (singular) (passion, emotion) in place of *pathē*. Rather than *pathē*, Cicero gives *pathos* a few lines later and in *Tusculan Disputations* 4.11.

[6] The Latin terms Cicero uses are the following: grief is *aegritūdō* (grief, sorrow, care—relative to the mind); fear is *formīdō* (fearfulness, fear, terror, dread, awe) or *metus* (fear, dread, apprehension, anxiety); desire is *libido* (desire, lust, longing, pleasure); and, what Cicero ends up terming 'delight,' is *laetitia* (joy, exultation, rejoicing, gladness, pleasure, delight). For other slightly different terms, see endnote 3 above.

[7] Croesus was the fabulously wealthy king of Lydia (ruled c. 560-546 BC).

[8] After "opportuneness," Cicero parenthetically adds, "For let us translate the Greek *eukairia* in this way," and after "right conduct," he explains, "Thus I translate *katorthōsis* since *katorthōma* is a single right action."