Reading 1

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The primary source for the following text is

Book 7 of Diogenes Laertius’ Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers.

All section numbers are part of Book 7. For example, section 42, or [42], is 7.42.

This reading comes from the Cave’s

The Best of the Early Stoics: The Lives, Writings & Teachings of the Early Stoics.

__________

After explaining that the Stoics divide philosophy

into three parts, logic, physics (natural philosophy), and ethics,

Diogenes Laertius writes:

Some Stoics divide the logical part of philosophy into two sciences—rhetoric and dialectic. Some would add the subdivision of definitions and another part having to do with canons and criteria. Others dispense with the part about definitions.

[42] Stoics accept the part that deals with canons and criteria as a means of discovering the truth. They use it to explain the different kinds of presentations [i] that we have. Similarly, they accept the part about definitions as a means of recognizing the truth, inasmuch as real things are objects that are grasped by means of conceptions.

By rhetoric they understand the science of speaking well on matters set out in detailed narrative speeches or expository speeches.

By dialectic they understand the science of correctly discussing subjects by means of question and answer. Another definition of dialectic is the science of true statements, false statements, or neither.

Rhetoric itself, they say, has three parts—the deliberative part, the judicial or forensic part, and the part concerned with panegyric or encomiastic. [43] According to them, rhetoric may be divided into invention of arguments, their expression in words, their arrangement, and their delivery. A rhetorical speech may be divided into an introduction, a narrative, replies to opponents, and the conclusion.

They hold that dialectic is divided into the topics regarding the things signified and the utterance. The topic regarding the things signified is divided into the topic about presentations and the topic about things said to which presentations give rise. Included in the topic about things said are propositions and complete expressions and predicates and similar terms, whether active or passive, and genera and species, as well as arguments and modes and syllogisms and fallacies or sophisms, whether due to the utterance or the subject matter. [44] The latter include both false and true and negative arguments, the Sorites paradox and the like, whether defective, insoluble, or conclusive, and the fallacies known as “the Veiled,” “the Nobody,” and “the Mowers.”

The second part that belongs to dialectic mentioned above is that of the utterance itself. Written utterance and the parts of discourse are included in this part. There is a discussion of errors in syntax and in single words, poetical diction, verbal ambiguities, euphony and music, and, according to some writers, chapters on terms, divisions, and style.

[45] Stoics hold that the study of syllogisms is very useful. Such a study shows us what is demonstrative or what offers proof. This contributes a good deal to the correction of judgments or opinions. Their arrangement and retention in memory give a scientific character to our comprehension of things.

An argument is in itself a whole that contains premises and a conclusion. A syllogism is an inferential argument composed of these parts. Demonstration is an argument that infers something that is less clearly grasped by means of things that are better grasped.

A presentation is an impression on the soul. The name is borrowed from the impress made by the seal ring upon the wax.

[46] There are two kinds of presentation. One directly apprehends real things; the other does not. The former, which they take to be the criterion or the test of reality, is that which proceeds from real things. It comes into being from an existing thing, being sealed and impressed on the soul by the existing thing itself. The latter, or non-apprehending kind of presentation, is that which does not proceed from any existing thing—or, if it does, it fails to agree with the existing thing itself. It is neither distinct nor clearly imprinted.

They hold that dialectic itself is necessary and a virtue, and that it encompasses the other kinds of virtues.

Deliberateness or freedom from rashness is the knowledge of when one should assent to something or not.

Discretion or levelheadedness is a strong rational stance relative to what merely seems to be so as not to be taken in by it.

[47] Irrefutability is strength in arguments so that one is not drawn over by the argument to the opposite side.

Earnestness or absence of frivolity is the habit of referring presentations to right reason.

Knowledge itself, they say, is either a firm and direct apprehension or a habit that is, in the reception of presentations, unchangeable by argument.

Without the study of dialectic, the wise man cannot guard himself in argument so that, as in a wrestling match, he will never be thrown. This is because the study of dialectic enables him to distinguish between truth and falsehood, and to judge well between what is plausible and what is ambiguously expressed.[ii] And without the study of dialectic, the wise man cannot methodically ask questions and give answers.

[48] Overhastiness in judgment affects the actual course of events, so that those who are untrained in presentations fall into disorder and a lack of purpose. There is no other way that a wise man may show himself to be sharp, ready-witted, and generally skillful in argumentation. It belongs to the same man to converse well and to argue well, and to discuss properly those subjects that are proposed to him, and to answer readily whatever questions are put to him. All these qualities belong to the man skillful in dialectics.

Such is, summarily stated, the substance of the Stoics’ logical teaching.

In order to give it in detail, as well, let me now cite as much of it as comes within the scope of their introductory handbook. I will quote verbatim what Diocles of Magnesia says in his Summary of Philosophers.[iii] These are his words:

[49] The Stoics have chosen to address first the doctrine of presentation and sensation, inasmuch as the criterion by which the truth of things is tested is a kind of presentation. Moreover, the account of assent and that of direct apprehension and that of intelligence, which precedes all the rest, cannot be given apart from presentation. This is so because the presentation comes first, then the intellect, which is capable of expressing itself, puts into the form of a word that which it receives from the presentation.

[50] There is a difference between a presentation and a phantasm—which is to say a vision or phantom appearance. A phantasm is an apparition in the intellect, the kind that may occur in sleep. A presentation is an impression on the soul. As Chrysippus states in the second book of his treatise On the Soul, it is an alteration. For, he says, we should not take “impression” in the literal sense of the impress of a seal since it is impossible to suppose that a number of such impressions will occur in one and the same spot at one and the same time. The presentation meant is that which comes from an existing or real thing, agrees with it, and has been stamped and impressed and sealed on the soul in a way that would not be the case if it came from a non-existing or unreal thing.

[51] According to the Stoics, some presentations are sense-based and others are not. Sense-based presentations are received by means of one or more of the senses or sense organs. Presentations that are not sense-based are those received through the intellect itself, as in the case with incorporeal things and all the other presentations that are received by reason. Of sense-based presentations, some are from existing or real things and come to be by yielding and assent. But there are also presentations that are reflection-appearances—they come to be as if from existing or real things.

Presentations may further be classified as rational or non-rational. The former are those of rational animals; the latter are those of non-rational animals. Rational presentations are thoughts, whereas those that are non-rational do not have a name.

Again, some presentations are skill-based, while others are not skill-based. A statue, anyway, is viewed differently by a trained and skilled craftsman in sculpting, for instance, than it is by one who is not trained and skilled.

[52] The Stoics apply the term sense-perception or sensation to the following: one, the breath or current passing from the leading part of the soul to the senses; two, direct apprehension by means of the senses; three, the equipment of the sense organs—though for some, these may be disabled. Moreover, the operation or activity of the sense organs is itself also called sensation.

According to the Stoics, it is by sensation that we apprehend black and white, and rough and smooth, whereas it is by reason that we apprehend the conclusions of demonstrations—such as the existence of the gods, as well as their foreknowledge.

Regarding conceptions, some come to be by direct experience, some by resemblance, some by analogy, some by transposition, some by combination, and some by opposition. [53] Sense objects are thought about by means of direct experience. We think about things related to those things near at hand by means of resemblance—as when we think of Socrates from a statue of Socrates. We think about things by means of analogy in terms of increasing the size of the thing, as with the giant Tityus and the Cyclops, and in terms of decreasing its size, as with the pygmy. In this way, the center of the earth is thought about analogously in terms of smaller spheres. An example of transposition is when we think about a man having eyes on his chest. We think about things such as a centaur, a half-man and half-horse creature, by means of combination. And things such as death by means of opposition. Moreover, by means of a kind of transition, we think about some things such as place and the meaning of words. Some conceptions such as justice and goodness come by means of nature. And some by means of deprivation, such as the man without hands.

This, then, is what they teach about presentation, sensation, and intelligence or understanding.

[54] The Stoics declare that the criterion of truth is a presentation that is directly apprehensible or graspable, that is, that which comes from an existing or real thing—this according to Chrysippus in the twelfth book of his Natural Philosophy, as well as according to Antipater and Apollodorus in their works. Boethus, on the other hand, admits a plurality of criteria—namely, mind, sensation, appetite, and knowledge. But Chrysippus differs in the first book of his treatise On Reason, where he declares that sensation and preconception are the only criteria. A preconception is a natural conception of universals or general concepts. Yet again, some others of the older Stoics make right reason the criterion, as does Posidonius in the treatise On the Criterion.

[55] In their theory of dialectic, most Stoics begin with the topic of the sound of the voice or utterance. Now utterance is a percussion of the air or the proper object of the sense of hearing, as Diogenes the Babylonian declares in his handbook On Utterance. While the sound of the voice or cry of an animal is just a percussion of air brought about by natural impulse, human utterance is articulate and, as Diogenes asserts, emitted by the intellect, which reaches maturity by the age of fourteen.

Furthermore, according to the Stoics, the sound of the voice or utterance is something corporeal, as Archedemus declares in his treatise On Utterance, as do Diogenes and Antipater, and Chrysippus in the second book of his Natural Philosophy. [56] For everything that produces an effect is a body. And the sound of the voice or utterance, as it proceeds from those who utter it to those who hear it, does produce an effect.

Speech, as Diogenes says, is the sound of the voice or utterance that contains letters. Take, for example, “Day.” A statement is the sound of the voice or utterance that is emitted by the intellect and signifies something, such as, “It is day.” Dialect is a variety of speech that is stamped on one part of the Greek world as distinct from another, or on the Greeks as distinct from other people groups. Or, yet again, dialect means a form of speech peculiar to some particular region, which is to say it has a certain linguistic quality. For example, the word for “sea” in Attic Greek is thalatta and not thalassa; and in Ionic Greek, day is hēmerē and not hēmera.

The twenty-four letters are the elements of speech. The term “letter,” however, has three meanings—the element, the character of the element, and the name, as with “Alpha.” [57] Seven of the letters are vowels: a, e, ē, i, o, u, ō. Six are mutes: b, g, d, k, p, t.[iv]

There is a difference between the utterance or sound of the voice and speech for the following reason: while the sound of the voice may include mere noise, speech is always articulate. And speech differs from a statement because the latter always signifies something, whereas a spoken word, such as “blituri,” may be unintelligible. Such is not possible for a statement. And to frame a statement is different from mere utterance. For while vocal sounds are uttered, things stated are real things, that is, they are “things said.”

There are five parts of speech. Diogenes says this in his treatise On Utterance—as does Chrysippus. They are the proper name, the common noun, the verb, the conjunction, and the article. In his work On Speech and Saying Things, Antipater adds what he calls the “middle position” or the participle.[v]

58 Diogenes Laertius discusses the five parts of speech with examples.

[59] There are five virtues of discourse: purity (that is, good Greek), clarity, conciseness, suitability, and elaboration. Good Greek is correct style, faultless in point of grammar and free from any random form of expression. Clarity is a style that presents the thought in a way that is easily understood. Conciseness is a style that employs no more words than are necessary for communicating the subject at hand. Suitability is found in a style that is appropriate or related to a subject. Elaboration is the avoidance of common expression.

Among the vices of discourse, barbarism is the violation of the usage of those Greeks of good reputation. Solecism is when discourse is incongruously constructed.

[60] In his treatise On Style, Posidonius defines a poetical phrase as one that is metrical and rhythmical, avoiding all resemblance of prose. An example of such a rhythmical phrase is: “O greatest earth, O pure sky of Zeus.” If such poetic phraseology is significant, and if it includes a portrayal or representation of human and divine things, then it is poetry.

As Antipater declares in the first book of his On Definitions, a definition is an expressed statement in accord with a precise analysis or reduction. According to Chrysippus in his book of the same name, a definition is an account of what is distinct. Delineation is a statement that brings one to a knowledge of the subject in outline. Or it may be called a definition that embodies the force of the definition itself in a simpler form.

Genus or general kind is the comprehension or inclusion in one thing of a number of inseparable objects of thought—for example, “animal,” for this term includes all specific animals.

[61] A notion or thought-object is a phantasm in the intellect that is neither something real nor any quality; rather, it is an apparent thing and an apparent quality. For example, a mental image of a horse may come to be even though there is no horse present.

Species or specific kind is that which is included under genus, as when “human” is included under “animal.” The most general kind is the general kind that does not have a genus, for example, being itself. The most specific kind is the specific kind that does not have a species, as with “Socrates.”

Division is the partition of a genus into its proximate species. For example, of animals, some are rational and some are non-rational. Contrary division separates the genus into species by means of the opposite, as with negation. For example, of things that are, some are good and some are not good. Subdivision is division applied to a previous division. For example, following upon “of things that are, some are good and some are not good,” we say, “of things that are not good, some are bad and some are indifferent, that is, neither good nor bad.”

[62] Partition is an arrangement or organization of a general kind into topics—as Crinis says. For example, of good things, some are goods of the soul and some are goods of the body.

Verbal ambiguity arises when speech properly, rightfully, and in accord with customary usage denotes two or more different things so that at one and the same time we may understand the word in several distinct senses. Take, for example, “aulētris peptōke.” The same verbal expression may mean something such as, “A courtyard wall has fallen three times,” or something such as, “The flute girl has fallen.”

Posidonius says that dialectic is the knowledge of truth and falsehood and that which is neither true nor false. Chrysippus declares that dialectic has to do with things that signify and things that are signified.

Such, then, is what the Stoics have to say in their theory of utterance or the sound of the voice.

[63] Under the topic related to real things and things signified, they include an account of things said. This account includes those things said that are complete in themselves, as well as propositions and syllogisms. It also includes incomplete expressions consisting of both active and passive predicates.

63-76 Diogenes Laertius goes on to give a full account of the Stoic teaching regarding “things said”—predicates, propositions (general and specific kinds), syllogisms, questions, and inquiries, among other things said (imperatives, addresses, and oaths). These various definitions prepare the discussion for its turn to argumentation and the different kinds of arguments.

[76] As the followers of Crinis declare, an argument consists of something taken as true (a major premise), an additional assumption (a minor premise), and a conclusion. For example, this: “If it is day, it is light. It is day. Therefore, it is light.” In this case, the sentence, “If it is day, it is light,” is the major premise. The minor premise is, “It is day.” And the conclusion is, “Therefore, it is light.”

A mode of a proposition is, as it were, the form of an argument. For instance, “If the first, then the second. But the first. Therefore, the second.”

[77] An argument mode is a combination of both the argument and the mode. For example, “If Plato is alive, Plato breathes. But the first. Therefore, the second.” The argument mode was introduced so that, when dealing with long complex, arguments, we would not have to repeat a long minor premise in order to state the conclusion. Rather, we would be able to arrive at the conclusion as concisely as possible. “But the first. Therefore, the second.”

Of arguments, some are endless or inconclusive, and some are conclusive. Inconclusive arguments are such that the opposite of the conclusion does not conflict with the combination of the premises. For example, “If it is day, it is light. But it is day. Therefore, Dion walks.”

[78] Of conclusive arguments, some are denoted by the common name of the whole genus, “conclusive.” But others are “syllogistic.” Syllogistic arguments are arguments that do not admit of, or they are reducible to arguments that do not admit of, immediate proof in relation to one or more of the premises. For example, “If Dion walks, then Dion is in motion. Dion is walking. Therefore, Dion is in motion.”

Those arguments that are specifically conclusive are those that draw conclusions without the use of a syllogism. For example, “It is false that it is day and it is night. It is day. Therefore, it is not night.”

Non-syllogistic arguments are those that plausibly resemble syllogistic arguments, but they do not conclude or make the inference. For example, “If Dion is a horse, he is an animal. But Dion is not a horse. Therefore, Dion is not an animal.”

[79] Further, of arguments, some are true and some are false. True arguments draw their conclusions by means of true premises. For example, “If virtue is beneficial, then vice is harmful. But virtue is beneficial. Therefore, vice is harmful.” False arguments have something false in at least one of the premises. Or a false argument is an inconclusive argument, as with the following example: “If it is day, it is light. It is day. Therefore, Dion is alive.”

There are also possible and impossible arguments, and necessary and non-necessary arguments.

Further, there are some arguments that are indemonstrable because they do not need demonstration. They are employed in the construction of every argument.

79-81 Diogenes Laertius presents the five kinds of indemonstrable arguments.

[81] According to the Stoics, a truth follows from a truth. For example, “It is light” follows from “It is day.” And a falsehood follows from a falsehood. “It is dark” follows from “It is night”—if, that is, the latter is false. And a truth follows from a falsehood. For example, “The earth exists” follows from “The earth flies.” However, a falsehood does not follow from a truth, for “The earth flies” does not follow from “The earth exists.”

[82] There are also certain insoluble arguments: the Veiled Men, the Disguised, the Sorites, the Horned Men, and the Nobodies. The Veiled is as follows: … [vi]“It cannot be that if two is few, three is not so likewise, nor that if two or three are few, four is not so likewise. And so on up to ten. But two is few. Therefore, so also is ten.” … The Nobody argument is an argument whose major premise consists of an indefinite and a definite clause, followed by a minor premise and a conclusion. For example, “If someone is here, that one is not in Rhodes. Someone is here. Therefore, there is not someone [or “there is nobody”] in Rhodes.”

[83] Such, then, is the logic of the Stoics by which they seek to establish their point that the one skilled in logical argument is the only wise man. For all things, they say, are perceived by means of logical study, including whatever belongs to the topic of natural philosophy or physics and again whatever belongs to ethics. For if the rational and logical man must say something about the correct use of terms, how could he fail to appoint the customary terms for actions? Moreover, of the two kinds of habit that relate to its virtue, one considers the nature of each existent thing, and the other asks what it is called. So much for their logic.

So ends Reading 1. See you in Reading 2, “Stoic Natural Philosophy or Physics in Diogenes’ Lives.”

Notes

i] See the “Introduction” for what the Stoics meant by “presentation.” For a simple definition, see Diogenes Laertius, Lives 7.45: “A presentation is an impression on the soul.”

[ii] Plausible (pithanos) could also be given as “persuasive” or “probable.”

[iii] Diocles of Magnesia (first century bc) was an ancient historian and writer of biography and summaries. He concentrated on the views, sayings, and lives of the earliest philosophers.

[iv] Using the Greek alphabet, the vowels are α, ε, η, ι, ο, υ, ω, and the mutes are β, γ, δ, κ, π, τ.

[v] The participle is a part of speech that is, as it were, in between a verb and a noun, having characteristics of both. Thus, it is in the middle or in the “middle position.”

[vi] There are several lacunae or gaps in the text in this paragraph. The example that follows, “It cannot be that if two is few, three is not so likewise …” serves to explain the Sorites (from sōros, the Greek for “quantity” or “heap”). Examples for the Veiled Men (where one simultaneously knows and does not know his father or brother because they are veiled or masked), the Horned Men (where one ends up actually having horns simply because he has not lost them), and the Disguised are missing. For a list of similar “insoluble arguments” or “dialectical arguments” by the Megarian Eubulides of Miletus (fourth century bc), see Diogenes Laertius, Lives 2.108.